Incomplete Definite Descriptions, Demonstrative Completion and Redundancy by Stojanovic, Isidora
Incomplete Definite Descriptions, Demonstrative
Completion and Redundancy
Isidora Stojanovic
To cite this version:
Isidora Stojanovic. Incomplete Definite Descriptions, Demonstrative Completion and Redun-
dancy. Striegnitz, Kristina et al. ESSLLI Student Session, Aug 2001, Helsinki, Finland. FoLLI,
pp.289-298, 2001. <ijn 00450403>
HAL Id: ijn 00450403
http://jeannicod.ccsd.cnrs.fr/ijn 00450403
Submitted on 26 Jan 2010
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destine´e au de´poˆt et a` la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publie´s ou non,
e´manant des e´tablissements d’enseignement et de
recherche franc¸ais ou e´trangers, des laboratoires
publics ou prive´s.
Incomplete Definite Descriptions, Demonstrative
Completion and Redundancy
Isidora Stojanovic
Stanford University, Dept. of Philosophy, Stanford CA 94305, USA
isidora@stanford.edu
March 20, 2002
Abstract
“Incomplete” definite descriptions (i.e. descriptions that violate the
uniqueness constraint) have been offered various accounts in semantics.
Among them, the so-called ellipsis account, which analyzes “the F” as
elliptical for “the F which is that F”. I begin by arguing that the
objections raised against this account have not been conclusive, and
go on to supply a new argument against it, which consists in showing
such demonstrative completions to be semantically redundant.
1 The Problem
A friend, whose dog I was playing with, said to me once:
(1) The dog likes you.
or perhaps:
(2) That dog likes you,
I don’t quite remember. To know which was exactly the sentence he used
does not seem to matter much. In contrast with layman’s intuitions, most
semantic theories see a huge difference between the way in which definite
descriptions, like “the dog”, and complex demonstratives, like “that dog”
contribute to the truth conditions. There is wide agreement that the dog
itself, Fido, is what “that dog” contributes to the truth conditions of (2)
so that (2) is true iff Fido likes me (at the time of the utterance.1 But
when it comes to definite descriptions, semanticists are at pains to agree
on how “the dog” contributes to the truth conditions of (1). If, following
1This view of demonstratives is common to David Kaplan’s account in (Kalpan, 1989)
and the theory of Richard Larson and Gabriel Segal in (Larson and Segal, 1990).
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Bertrand Russell,2 “the such-and-such is so-and-so” is true iff exactly one
thing is such-and-such, and it is also so-and-so, then (1) is bound to be false,
it seems, since there are plenty of dogs in the universe.
“Incomplete” definite descriptions, which violate Russell’s uniqueness
condition, seem to pose a problem only to the accounts that do not view
definite descriptions as referential expressions.3 Why not say, then, that
definite descriptions can at least be referentially used , so that (1) and (2)
end up receiving the same truth conditions?4 Yet another option is to say
that (1) literally says something false, but conveys something true, namely,
that Fido likes me.5 Some might be tempted to say that the domain of
discourse relevant to interpreting (1) contains only one dog, Fido, so that the
uniqueness condition becomes fulfilled after all. The portion of the universe
over which the quantifier ranges would be then specified by the context.6
At last, some might suggest that not the whole sentence is phonetically
realized in (1). (1) would then simply serve as a shorthand for something
more complex, like:
(3) The dog that you are playing with right now likes you.
(1) might as well be a shorthand for (2). Then all one needs to do is
recover a completion that will prevent the failure of the uniqueness condi-
tion.7
In the last century, many accounts of incomplete definite descriptions
have seen light, but none has received a unanimous support, and, more
importantly, none has been refuted either, pace claims to the contrary. In
this paper, I focus on the so-called ellipsis approach. I begin by arguing that
the arguments offered against it did not prove conclusive. I provide two
replies to the argument from indeterminacy , which objects to the ellipsis
approach that it fails to recover a determinate completion. One reply is
that the recovery devices may themselves depend upon the context in a way
that allows them to yield a determinate completion. The other reply is that
one can associate to every incomplete description a canonical completion,
namely, a demonstrative completion that recovers “that” over “the”. I then
argue that the argument from knowledge, which points that one may be
ignorant of demonstratives while competent at using incomplete definite
2See (Russell, 1905). Russell’s proposal has been incorporated in the framework of
generalized quantifiers, as in (Neale, 1990) or (Larson and Segal, 1990).
3For a famous defense of a Referential account of definite descriptions see (Strawson,
1950).
4See (Donnellan, 1966).
5See (Kripke, 1977), and (Bach, 1994).
6The suggestion goes back to (Barwise and Cooper, 1981). Jason Stanley and Zolta´n
Szabo´ contend that this is the only sound view of incomplete descriptions. See (Stanley
and Szabo´, 2000).
7See (Neale, 2000).
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descriptions, does not go through for the simple fact that, in general, one
does not have to know the phonetic realization of some particular expression
in order to make an ellipsis on that expression.
Even though the ellipsis account of incomplete descriptions resists both
arguments, it still appears to be deeply mistaken. The reason, I argue,
is that demonstrative completions over definite descriptions, likely to be
forced upon the account by the argument from indeterminacy, are actually
redundant. Incomplete definite descriptions are not always meant to refer to
particular objects. That is descriptions used attributively and anaphorically
may help us to get to the redundancy result. It is clear that such incomplete
descriptions may be completed into complex demonstratives salva congrui-
tate. The question is how demonstratives used attributively or anaphorically
are to be accounted for. If such demonstratives are seen as definite descrip-
tions in disguise, the ellipsis account will be circular and lack a solution to
the problem that it purports to solve. If, on the other hand, they are still
seen as genuine referential expressions, the account will lack motivations
for not considering definite descriptions as referential expressions from the
outset.8
2 The Argument from Indeterminacy
In its typical instances, bare ellipsis consists in leaving out some expression
recoverable from the discourse, as in:
(4) Bill wants pie for dessert and Al pudding.
(5) Bill has one child and Al four.
Thus the speaker of (4) fails to pronounce the whole sentence “Al wants
pudding for dessert”, while the speaker of (5) omits “has” and “children”,
recoverable from the previously used “child”.9
Some cases of incomplete descriptions fit nicely into this picture. Con-
sider:
(6) I saw a neighbor of mine kissing a woman on the staircase. The
woman was his wife.
It could be that the description “the woman” is a shorthand for e.g. “the
woman that I saw being kissed by a neighbor of mine on the staircase”, which
8It is noteworthy that from the standpoint of etymology, the ties between demonstra-
tives and the definite article are straightforward. The idea that “the” is a reduced form
of “that” may be found e.g. in (Jespersen, 1924).
9(4) is an example from Kent Bach, who wrote: “Utterances are elliptical, strictly
speaking, only if the suppressed material is recoverable (..) by grammatical means alone”.
(Bach, 1994, p. 131)
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is recoverable from the discourse alone. However, not many incomplete
descriptions are amenable to this sort of analysis. Take Keith Donnellan’s
well-known example: having come upon Smith’s cruelly mutilated body, the
inspector, without suspecting anyone in particular, says:
(7) The murderer must be insane.
There is nothing in the discourse itself to complete the description. To
keep viewing “the murderer” as a shorthand for another description respect-
ful of the uniqueness constraint, the recovery of the elided material had bet-
ter depend not only upon the linguistic context, but upon the context in
its most general sense. Let us call narrow the approach that constrains the
recovery of the elided material down to linguistic inputs only, and broad the
approach that allow any kind of contextual input. Both philosophers and
linguists seem to agree that no narrow approach can be worked out – as (7)
already suggests – and that no broad approach can be worked out either,
since there seems to be no algorithm to tell us how to recover the elided ma-
terial. Howard Wettstein wrote: “When one says, e.g., ‘The table is covered
with books’, the table the speaker has in mind can be more fully described
in any number of ways (..) Since these more complete descriptions are not
synonymous, it follows that each time we replace (..) ‘the table’ with a dif-
ferent one of these ‘Russellian’ descriptions, it would seem that we obtain
an expression for a different proposition”.10
Some have thought, erroneously, that Wettstein’s worry would not arise
if “non- descriptive” completions were possible: completions with referential
expressions which, albeit different, would pick out the same referent.11 But
as pointed out by Marga Reimer, “even if completions of incomplete de-
scriptions are stipulated to be non-descriptive, the problem of adjudicating
between non-equivalent, co-denoting descriptions remains”.12
So let me put the argument from indeterminacy as follows: The ellipsis
approach to incomplete descriptions fails because it does not formulate any
algorithm that may tell us how to recover a determinate completion over an
incomplete description.
To rule out this argument, it will not do just to have non-descriptive
completions, whose values depend on the context of utterance. The “algo-
rithm” that yields those completions should also be able to depend on the
context. Now, Wettstein has argued convincingly enough that there was no
obvious algorithm leading from an incomplete description to its completion,
and that even the speaker may be unable to point to some determinate com-
pletion. But this does not show yet that there are utterances of incomplete
10(Wettstein, 1981, p. 246)
11e.g. Stephen Neale in (Neale, 1990)
12(Reimer, 1992, p. 353); Franc¸ois Recanati similarly noted: “Even if we accept that
the expressed content is singular, still it is totally indeterminate which particular sentence
expressing that content the uttered sentence is elliptical for”. (Recanati, 1996, p. 449 fn.)
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descriptions which lack a determinate completion. The point may be made
clear by looking at the behavior of demonstratives. The linguistic meaning
of a demonstrative such as “that” does not correspond to any expression
a` la “what I am pointing to” or “what I have in mind”. In other words,
no unique expression encodes an algorithm that leads from a demonstrative
to its referent. But this does not mean that there are utterances of “that”
without a determinate referent. The meaning of “that” might exploit all the
cues that the context makes available, take those cues as inputs, and give
us the referent of “that” as an output. This is perfectly compatible with
the fact that we did not manage to come up with a suitably formulated
algorithm. Similarly, one may suggest that the meaning of “the” exploits
any contextual cue available so as to single out a completion.13
There is a reply, then, to the argument from indeterminacy. True, it
‘passes the buck’ to the semantics of “the”, but this simply shows that
there is no special link between indeterminacy and ellipsis. Besides, it takes
little to realize that other accounts of incomplete descriptions are not any
better off in this regard. Indeterminacy is a very general phenomenon,
and Stanley and Szabo´ were wrong to think that indeterminacy obliged the
ellipsis approach to place “intolerable burdens on any possible solution” to
the semantics of “the”. They wrote: “context has to provide a specific
predicate (..) And it is exceedingly hard to see what feature of context
could [select the predicate F among other candidates]”.14 At the same time,
they did not see the same “intolerable burden” placed on the contextual
restriction of the domain of discourse. But take (7). What feature of context
could restrict the domain down to a set that contains no other murderers
than whoever happens to have murdered Smith? Why should some person
rather than another belong there? The only way to restrict the domain
appropriately would be, it seems, by means of some clause like “the murderer
of the person whose mutilated body we are looking at”. And it makes little
difference whether this clause helps to restrict the domain of discourse, or
itself constitutes what is recovered over some other expression.
3 The Argument from Knowledge
There is another possible reply to the argument from indeterminacy, which
moreover makes a good case for the narrow ellipsis approach to incomplete
descriptions. The reply consists in showing that for every incomplete de-
scription it is possible to come up with a determinate, canonical completion.
13It is somewhat ironical that Wettstein, who supports this view for demonstratives in
(Wettstein, 1984), should thus provide a possible reply to his own argument against the
ellipsis account of incomplete descriptions.
14(Wettstein, 1984, p. 238). The issue of indeterminacy is also known as the issue of
underdetermination. For discussion, see (Recanati, 1993, p. 235 ff.).
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Thus every definite description “the F” that violates the uniqueness con-
straint while empirically yielding true utterances may be seen as elliptical
for “the F which is that F”, or simply for “that F”. The user of an incom-
plete description may be then seen as having failed to pronounce /at/ after
/th/. He has used a definite article while intending to use a demonstrative.
First of all, it should be shown that canonical completion works. That
is obvious for those cases in which there is something contextually salient
that the description singles out, in the way in which “the dog” singles out
Fido in (1). The cases that are worrisome are rather of the same ilk as (6),
in which the description is anaphoric, or as (7), in which it is attributive.
But, as it turns out, complex demonstratives also allow for anaphoric as well
as for attributive uses.15 One can utter “that such-and- such is so-and-so”,
just as one can utter “the such-and-such is so-and-so”, in order to attribute
the property of being so-and-so to whatever is such-and-such, even when
there is nothing of which the speaker wishes to say that it is such-and-such.
Thus, instead of (7), the inspector might have said as well:
(8) That murdered must be insane.
If we turn to definite descriptions used anaphorically, we also see that
they can always be replaced, in a more or less felicitous manner, by complex
demonstratives. Thus, instead of (6), I might have said as well:
(9) I saw a neighbor of mine kissing a woman on the staircase. That
woman was his wife.
Let us assume, for the sake of argument, that substituting “that” for
“the” generally works. The output of the substitution may be less felicitous
than the input, but there shall be no difference in the truth conditions. Will
there be anything wrong, then, with the narrow ellipsis approach? Stanley
and Szabo´ thought they had a knockdown argument against it, which I shall
call the argument from knowledge. They wrote: “Suppose that Max is not a
fully competent speaker of English. (..) The use of demonstrative pronouns
is not discussed until unit 7 and Max is not there yet. (..) Since Max does
not know the word ‘that’, he cannot identify the sentence uttered by the
speaker of (1) which contains that word as an unarticulated constituent”.16
As Max, competent in the use of the definite article, has no difficulties to
understand (1), Stanley and Szabo´ were led to conclude that (1) cannot be
elliptical for (2).
If this argument were to be taken seriously, it would have been a knock-
down argument against ellipsis in general. Thus, suppose that Max does
15In (King, 1999), Jeffrey King uses precisely this sort of cases to motivate an account
of complex demonstratives in terms of restricted quantifiers.
16(King, 1999, p. 238); “unarticulated” reads as “elided”. I have taken the liberty of
making necessary changes so that the quote fits the examples that I have been using here.
6
not know what the plural of “child” is, but knows that it is irregular. As
he does not want to reveal his ignorance, he says “Bill has one child and Al
four”, as in (5). Shall we say then that his utterance cannot be elliptical for
“Bill has one child and Al has four children”? No. Ignorance of the pho-
netic realization of some grammatical form of an expression is not enough
to prevent us from making utterances elliptical on that expression, still less
from understanding them.17
4 The Argument from Redundancy
Let me take stock. The narrow ellipsis approach, which over every incom-
plete description recovers a canonical, demonstrative completion, meets the
argument from indeterminacy in that it does provide a determinate comple-
tion, whereas the argument from knowledge has simply proved flawed. Now,
the question was how to ascribe correct truth conditions to an utterance that
involves a definite description that does not single out a unique entity. If the
ellipsis approach is to provide a solution, it must be able to ascribe correct
truth conditions to utterances that involve complex demonstratives in lieu
of incomplete definite descriptions. The view on which “that” is a referen-
tial expression whose truth-conditional contribution consists of its referent
has no problem with those cases in which there is some contextually salient
referent, as in Fido’s case. Rather, the question is how that view deals with
other cases, in which demonstratives are used attributively or anaphorically.
If demonstratives lose their referential character in those cases, and turn out
to be definite descriptions in disguise, then the ellipsis approach clearly lacks
a clue to the problem of incomplete descriptions. Conversely, if demonstra-
tives keep referential even when they are used attributively or anaphorically,
then it must be possible to provide definite descriptions themselves with an
account that sees them as referential expressions. In either case, the recov-
ery of the demonstrative over the definite article must prove unattractive,
since the material recovered turns out to be redundant. Albeit possible, the
ellipsis approach is far from attractive, for either it lacks a solution to the
problem that it purports to solve, or it lacks motivations for not analyzing
definite descriptions as referential expressions, while being able to do so.18
17Had Max have no concept of demonstratives, perhaps he would have given us reasons
to be suspicious toward the ellipsis approach. But it is far from clear that anyone without
any idea of how demonstratives work could ever grasp what (1) says. And it is not much
more clear that the mastery of “that” requires anything more than does the mastery of
“the”.
18The cases that pose problems for referential accounts of definite descriptions – cases
which had originally motivated Russell’s view – are precisely the cases of descriptions
attributively used and the cases of anaphora. If there is a referential account of demon-
stratives that covers their anaphoric and attributive uses, that same account should apply
to definite descriptions. The choice, then, to reserve the referential account for demon-
stratives and to subject definite descriptions to a non-referential one can only be arbitrary
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In the remainder of the paper, let me try to see whether there is a refer-
ential account of demonstratives that covers their anaphoric and attributive
uses. (Keep in mind, though, that the answer does not affect the argument
itself.)
The cases of anaphora that we have seen are not, so to say, difficult
enough, since there is something singled out by the antecedent. Consider
this harder case instead:
(10) Whenever you see a neighbor of yours kissing a woman on the
staircase, the woman (/ that woman) may easily happen to be his
wife.
The quantifier “whenever”, which, for our purposes, may be taken to
range over situations, makes it clear that there is not a single woman rele-
vant to the truth of (10). How can “that woman” then occur as a referential
expression in (10)? It seems that if “that woman” were a genuine demon-
strative, there would have to be some particular woman whom it would
stand for.
Notwithstanding appearances, there appears to be a way of maintain-
ing a referential approach to complex demonstratives, even when they are
anaphoric on non-referential expressions.19
We can roughly say that (10) is true iff C is true for every pair of refer-
ential terms substituted for (x) and (y) respectively, where C is the condi-
tional: ‘when you see (x) kissing (y) in the staircase and (x) is a neighbor
of yours and (y) is a woman, (y) may easily happen to be (x)’s wife’. The
general idea is that every situation involving a neighbor of yours and some
woman in which you can truly say: “I see him, a neighbor of mine, kissing
that woman on the staircase”, is also a situation in which you can truly
say: “that woman may well happen to be his wife”. In other words, we
no longer take quantifiers to range properly over individuals, but only over
situations.20
There is one step left from a referential account of demonstratives anaphor-
ically used to a referential account of demonstratives attributively used,
hence of definite descriptions. Recall the situation that was under consider-
ation. Seeing Smith’s body cruelly mutilated, the inspector says:
and unmotivated.
19In certain respects, the account is similar to Gareth Evans’ account of unbound
anaphoric pronouns (also called E-type): “If we adopt a Fregean account of satisfac-
tion, we have only to give an account of the pronoun-antecedent construction as it occurs
in singular sentences – no further explanation need be given of pronouns with quantifier
antecedents. (..) A natural explanation of the role of pronouns with singular antecedents
is in terms of co-reference – the pronoun refers to whatever the antecedent refers to”.
(Evans, 1985, p. 227); See also (Evans, 1977).
20There are other frameworks favorable to the idea. E.g. one can make quantifiers range
over events, or over (possible) contexts. It goes without saying that within the boundaries
of the present paper I can at best hint at a referential account of unbound anaphora.
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(11) That murderer must be insane.
How can “that” occur as a genuine demonstrative in (11)? – there is
nobody salient in the context that the inspector was talking about, nobody
he meant to speak of otherwise than as of whoever happened to be the
murderer. And if “that murderer” is not a demonstrative, but a definite de-
scription in disguise, then it is plainly circular to suggest that “the murder”
used under the same circumstances should be elliptical for “that murderer”.
Once again, however, it seems possible to continue treating “that mur-
derer” as a referential expression. All we need to do is make our quantifiers
range not over individuals, but over something else – situations, events, con-
texts, possible substitution instances, and so on. On Russell’s view, (11) is
true iff there is one and only one individual who is a murderer, and who,
moreover, must be insane. Swaying the range of our quantifiers from in-
dividuals to situations, we would say that (11) is true iff there is one and
only one situation in which one would speak truly if one said: “That murder
must be insane”, using “that” in reference to someone demonstrated in that
situation. Such an account would clearly preserve the referential character
of “that murderer”. So the idea is that the demonstrative always acts as a
referential expression, i.e. as an expression that contributes its referent to
the truth conditions. Yet, in order to fix the referent, one must have settled
on some particular situation. Most often, the situation settled on is the cur-
rent one, that is, the situation in which the utterance is taking place. But
that need not be the case. One may also settle on other situations, or even
not settle on any particular situation at all. Thus one may simply state the
existence of a situation, so that the situation relevant to fixing the reference
of “that” would merely be a hypothetical situation – which is what probably
happens in (11).
To be sure, the proposal that I have just canvassed does not amount to
providing a solution to attributive uses of expressions normally seen as refer-
ential.21 But what it does show is that the possibility of using an expression
attributively is compatible with the possibility of giving that expression a
referential account.22 The referential account that can be given for “that”,
including its anaphoric and attributive uses, is likely to extend into a ref-
erential account of the definite article itself. As a consequence, an account
of definite descriptions in terms of quantifiers that posits a demonstrative
completion when it comes to incomplete descriptions, would simply prove
unmotivated – or dismotivated, as might be a more proper way of putting it
21Both complex demonstratives and pronouns appear to have attributive uses. Indeed,
“that murderer” may be successfully replaced by “he” in (11). Another well-known ex-
ample is that of a person who, spotting gigantic footprints, says: “He must be a giant”.
22In this way, the referential account of “the”, built out from the referential account
of “that” attributively used, will not blur the epistemological distinction between two
manners of individuating things – namely, by direct reference vs. by description –, brought
to light by Russell in (Russell, 1910).
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– given that the initial motivations for a non-referential account of definite
descriptions are likely to vanish in the presence of a referential account of
demonstratives that behave in the same way as definite descriptions do.
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